Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

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Dow Construction, L.L.C. leased property within a forced pooled drilling unit operated by BPX Operating Company. Dow received proceeds from the unit but disputed the deduction of post-production costs by BPX. Dow sought a judgment to recover these costs, while BPX sought dismissal and summary judgment on various grounds.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana held that Dow had standing to sue and that the Louisiana doctrine of negotiorum gestio allowed operators to recover post-production costs. The court also ruled that the forced-pooling statute’s forfeiture provision included post-production costs and that claims under this statute were subject to a ten-year prescriptive period. BPX's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment were partially granted and denied, leading to an interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s interpretation that La. Rev. Stat. § 30:10(A)(3) applies to mineral interest owners unleased by the operator. However, it vacated the district court’s ruling that negotiorum gestio allows operators to recover post-production costs, following a Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Self v. BPX Operating Co. The court affirmed that post-production costs are included within the forfeiture provision of La. Rev. Stat. § 30:103.2. Finally, the court reversed the district court’s finding on the prescriptive period, holding that claims under § 30:103.2 are subject to a one-year prescriptive period, not ten years.The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Dow Construction v. BPX Operating Co." on Justia Law

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The case involves Francis Kaess, who owns mineral interests in land in Pleasants County, West Virginia, subject to an oil and gas lease with BB Land, LLC. The lease provides for in-kind royalties, meaning Kaess is entitled to a portion of the physical oil and gas produced. However, Kaess did not take his share in-kind, and BB Land sold his share and deducted postproduction costs from his royalties.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia reviewed the case and denied BB Land's motion for summary judgment on the issue of improper deductions. The court found that the requirements for deducting postproduction costs, as established in Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc. and Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, LLC, apply to in-kind leases. BB Land then sought to certify questions to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the certified questions. The court reaffirmed the principles established in Wellman and Estate of Tawney, which require that any deductions for postproduction costs must be expressly stated in the lease, identify specific deductions, and indicate the method of calculating these deductions. The court held that these requirements also apply to leases with in-kind royalty provisions.The court concluded that there is an implied duty to market the minerals in oil and gas leases with in-kind royalty provisions. If the lessor does not take their share in-kind, the lessee must market and sell the lessor's share along with their own and pay the lessor a royalty based on the gross proceeds received at the first point of sale to an unaffiliated third-party purchaser, free from any deductions for postproduction expenses. The court answered both certified questions in the affirmative. View "Kaess v. BB Land, LLC" on Justia Law

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A man was injured while working on a man-made island in the Beaufort Sea, which served as an oil and gas drill site. In February, he drove a forklift down a ramp to unload cargo from a sled on the frozen sea. A colleague followed in a wheel loader, lost control, and collided with the sled and the forklift, crushing the man's leg. The man sued the companies owning and operating the island, alleging coverage under the Longshoreman and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) and maritime tort jurisdiction.The Superior Court of Alaska dismissed the man's LHWCA claims as unripe and ruled that the accident did not meet the two-prong test for maritime tort jurisdiction. The court found that the accident lacked the potential to disrupt maritime commerce and did not have a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activities. The court also concluded that the Alaska Worker’s Compensation Act (AWCA) barred the man from pursuing state law claims against the companies.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case. It held that the superior court properly dismissed the LHWCA-related claims, as eligibility for LHWCA benefits does not automatically establish maritime tort jurisdiction, and the LHWCA does not preempt the AWCA. However, the Supreme Court found that the superior court erred in its analysis of the maritime nexus prong. The accident had the potential to disrupt maritime commerce and bore a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activities, such as unloading cargo.The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the superior court’s dismissal of the maritime tort claims and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the accident met the locus prong of the maritime jurisdiction test. View "Beckwith v. ENI Petroleum US, LLC" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) extending the construction deadline for the Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC (MVP) Southgate Project. Initially, FERC issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the Southgate Project in June 2020, setting a construction completion deadline of June 18, 2023. However, due to unresolved permitting issues for the Mainline, which Southgate extends from, the construction could not proceed as planned. MVP requested an extension shortly before the deadline, citing delays in Mainline permitting as the reason for not meeting the original deadline.The Commission granted MVP's extension request, finding that MVP had demonstrated good cause due to unavoidable circumstances, specifically the Mainline permitting delays. FERC also maintained that its previous assessments of market need and environmental impacts for the Southgate Project remained valid and did not require reevaluation.Eight environmental organizations petitioned for review, arguing that FERC's decision to extend the construction deadline and its refusal to revisit prior assessments were arbitrary and capricious. They contended that MVP had not made reasonable efforts to advance the Southgate Project and that the market need and environmental impact analyses were outdated.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC reasonably found that MVP had satisfied the good cause standard for the extension, given the permitting and litigation delays with the Mainline. The court also upheld FERC's decision not to revisit its prior findings on market need and environmental impacts, concluding that the information presented by the petitioners did not constitute significant changes in circumstances. Consequently, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Appalachian Voices v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

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David W. Cromwell and Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC are co-tenants in an oil-and-gas lease on land in Loving County, Texas. Cromwell obtained his interests in 2009 through two leases, one with Carmen Ferrer and one with the Tantalo Trust. Both leases contained habendum clauses that extended the lease terms as long as minerals were produced from the land. Anadarko, which already had a working interest and had drilled wells on the land, continued to produce minerals. Cromwell repeatedly sought to participate in production and enter a joint operating agreement with Anadarko, but Anadarko did not respond. Despite this, Anadarko sent Cromwell joint interest invoices and treated him as a working interest owner.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Anadarko, ruling that Cromwell's leases terminated at the end of their primary terms because he did not personally cause production. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas affirmed, holding that Cromwell was required to take action to cause production to keep his leases alive, based on the court's previous decision in Cimarex Energy Co. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the plain language of the habendum clauses did not require Cromwell to personally produce minerals to maintain his interests. The court emphasized that the leases did not specify who must produce the minerals and that production in commercial paying quantities had continuously occurred on the land. Therefore, Cromwell's leases did not terminate. The court disapproved of previous decisions that required lessees to personally produce minerals when the lease language did not explicitly state such a requirement. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to the trial court to address the parties' remaining arguments. View "CROMWELL v. ANADARKO E&P ONSHORE, LLC" on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute between American Midstream (Alabama Intrastate), LLC (AMID) and Rainbow Energy Marketing Corporation (Rainbow) over a contract (MAG-0005) for the transportation and balancing of natural gas. Rainbow had contracts to transport gas through two interconnected pipelines, the Transco and the Magnolia, and used the MAG-0005 to leverage AMID’s balancing flexibility. The contract allowed Rainbow to run imbalances, withdrawing gas without simultaneously supplying an equal amount, provided they resupplied by the end of each month. Disputes arose when Transco began limiting imbalances more strictly, leading to AMID curtailing Rainbow’s nominations on several occasions.The trial court found in favor of Rainbow on all its claims, including breach of contract, repudiation, fraud, fraudulent inducement, and negligent misrepresentation, awarding over $6 million in lost profits. The court interpreted Section 9.1 of the MAG-0005 as excusing AMID’s performance only under specific conditions involving scheduled and physical imbalances. The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s decision, agreeing with its interpretation of the contract and the award of damages.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the trial court had erroneously inserted language into Section 9.1 of the MAG-0005. The correct interpretation of Section 9.1 excused AMID from providing balancing services on any day that Transco required AMID or Rainbow to limit imbalances attributable to Rainbow, without distinguishing between types of imbalances. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions, rendered judgment for AMID on Rainbow’s contract-repudiation and tort claims, and remanded for a new trial on the breach-of-contract claims to determine if Transco mandates excused AMID’s performance on the days in question. View "AMERICAN MIDSTREAM (ALABAMA INTRASTATE), LLC v. RAINBOW ENERGY MARKETING CORPORATION" on Justia Law

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Chenault-Vaughan Family Partnership ("Chenault"), a royalty interest holder in a Texas mineral estate, sued Centennial Resources Operating, LLC ("Centennial"), the site operator, for wrongly withholding royalties. The Bankruptcy Court awarded summary judgment to Centennial. Chenault appealed to the District Court, where the parties consented to proceed before a Magistrate Judge. The Magistrate Judge affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment, and Chenault appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.The Third Circuit first addressed whether the Magistrate Judge had jurisdiction to enter final judgment in the bankruptcy appeal. The court concluded that, with the consent of the parties and a referral by the district court, a magistrate judge may enter final judgment in a bankruptcy appeal. This conclusion was supported by the broad consent authority granted to magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the repeal of the statutory provision that previously prohibited such referrals, and the supervisory authority retained by Article III judges.On the merits, the Third Circuit reviewed the Bankruptcy Court’s summary judgment on two claims: trespass to try title and royalties under the Texas Natural Resources Code ("TNRC"). The court affirmed the summary judgment for Centennial on the trespass-to-try-title claim, finding that Centennial did not unlawfully enter the land and dispossess Chenault, as Luxe, a cotenant, had the right to extract minerals and permit Centennial to operate.However, the court vacated the summary judgment on the TNRC claim. The court found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Centennial was obligated to pay Unit B royalties to Chenault, particularly concerning the Division Order and Centennial’s knowledge of MDC’s non-signature on the Unit B JOA. The case was remanded to the Magistrate Judge with instructions to remand to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings on the TNRC claim. View "In re: MTE Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

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Larry Householder, former Speaker of the Ohio House of Representatives, and lobbyist Matthew Borges were convicted of conspiring to solicit and receive nearly $60 million in exchange for passing a billion-dollar bailout for a failing nuclear energy company, FirstEnergy Corp. Householder used the funds to support his bid for the speakership and to recruit candidates who would vote for him. Borges played a role in the conspiracy by attempting to disrupt a referendum campaign against the bailout legislation.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati found both Householder and Borges guilty after a 26-day trial. Householder was convicted of multiple counts, including public-official bribery, private-citizen bribery, and money laundering. Borges was also found guilty of participating in the conspiracy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found no reversible error, affirming the convictions. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings that Householder and Borges engaged in a quid pro quo arrangement with FirstEnergy. The court also upheld the jury instructions, finding them consistent with applicable law, and rejected Householder's claims of insufficient evidence, right to counsel violations, and judicial bias. Additionally, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings or in admitting the guilty pleas of co-conspirators.Householder's sentence of twenty years, the statutory maximum under RICO, was deemed procedurally and substantively reasonable. The court emphasized the magnitude and severity of Householder's offense, referring to it as the "biggest corruption case in Ohio's history." Borges's arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and the district court's evidentiary rulings were also rejected, and his conviction was affirmed. View "United States v. Householder" on Justia Law

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Continental Resources, Inc., an oil and gas production company, leases minerals from both the North Dakota Board of University and School Lands (Land Board) and the United States. The dispute centers on the entitlement to royalties from minerals extracted from the bed of Lake Sakakawea in North Dakota, which depends on the location of the Ordinary High Water Mark (OHWM). If North Dakota law and the state survey govern the OHWM, the Land Board is entitled to a larger percentage of the royalties; if the federal survey controls, the United States is entitled to a larger percentage.The United States removed the interpleader action to federal court and moved to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota denied the motion, holding that under 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a)(5), the United States waived sovereign immunity because North Dakota law created a lien in favor of the United States upon Continental severing the minerals. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States for lands retained since North Dakota's admission to the Union, applying federal law and the Corps Survey. It granted summary judgment in favor of the Land Board for lands reacquired by the United States, applying North Dakota law and the Wenck survey.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss, agreeing that the United States had a lien on the disputed minerals under North Dakota law. The court also affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the Land Board, holding that North Dakota law governs the current location of the OHWM for lands reacquired by the United States. The court denied the United States' motion for judicial notice of additional documents. View "Continental Resources, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

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A solar energy company, Harvey Solar I, L.L.C., applied to the Ohio Power Siting Board for a certificate to construct a solar-powered electric-generation facility in Licking County, Ohio. The project faced opposition from a local citizens group, Save Hartford Twp., L.L.C., and 11 nearby residents, who raised concerns about the environmental and economic impacts of the project, including visual impacts, flooding, wildlife disruption, noise, water quality, and glare.The Ohio Power Siting Board reviewed the application and conducted an evidentiary hearing. The board staff investigated the potential impacts and recommended approval with conditions. The board ultimately granted the certificate, subject to 39 conditions, including requirements for visual screening, floodplain coordination, wildlife impact mitigation, noise control, and stormwater management.The residents appealed the board's decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, arguing that the board failed to properly evaluate the project's adverse impacts and that Harvey Solar did not provide sufficient information as required by the board's rules. They contended that the board's decision was unlawful and unreasonable.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that the board had acted within its statutory authority and had not violated any applicable laws or regulations. The court determined that the board had sufficient evidence to make the required determinations under R.C. 4906.10(A) and that the conditions imposed on the certificate were reasonable and appropriate. The court affirmed the board's order granting the certificate for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the solar facility. View "In re Application of Harvey Solar I, L.L.C." on Justia Law