Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal was the second relating to a suit brought by the City of Hesperia (the City) against respondents Lake Arrowhead Community Services District and the Board of Directors of Lake Arrowhead Community Services District (jointly, the District) regarding a proposed 0.96-megawatt solar photovoltaic project (the Solar Project) that the District had been planning to develop on six acres of a 350-acre property it owned, known as the Hesperia Farms Property. The Hesperia Farms Property was located within the City’s municipal boundary and was generally subject to the City’s zoning regulations. The District first approved its Solar Project in December 2015, after determining that the project was either absolutely exempt from the City’s zoning regulations under Government Code section 53091, or qualifiedly exempt under Government Code section 53096. The City sought a writ of mandate prohibiting the District from further pursuing the Solar Project. In Hesperia I, the Court of Appeal determined the District’s Solar Project was not exempt from the City’s zoning regulations under Government Code section 53091’s absolute exemption, or under Government Code section 53096’s qualified exemption. The Court concluded, however, that Government Code section 52096’s qualified exemption did not apply to the District’s approval of the Solar Project only because the District had failed to provide substantial evidence to support its conclusion that there was no other feasible alternative to its proposed location for the Solar Project. This result left open the possibility that the District could undertake further analyses and show that there was no feasible alternative to the Solar Project’s proposed location in order to avoid application of the City’s zoning ordinances. A few months after the District made its second no-feasible-alternative determination with respect to the Solar Project, the City filed a second petition for writ of mandate and complaint challenging the Solar Project. The trial court ultimately denied the City’s second petition. When the City appealed, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err in rejecting the City’s petition for writ of mandate. View "City of Hesperia v. Lake Arrowhead Community Services Dist." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) establishing a regulatory framework for a certain renewable energy product, holding that the trial court correctly correctly determined that the reactions did not violate the dormant commerce clause.In 2020, PURA imposed a series of restrictions on retail electric suppliers offering Connecticut customers voluntary products, known as voluntary renewable offers (VROs), consisting of renewable energy credits (REC) bundled with electric supply. One of the restrictions at issue, the geographic restriction, prohibited VROs from containing RECs sourced outside of particular geographic regions. The other restriction, the marketing restriction, required suppliers to provide clear language informing consumers that a VRO backed by RECs is an energy product backed by RECs rather than a renewable energy itself. Plaintiffs argued that both restrictions violated the dormant commerce clause. The trial court rejected Plaintiffs' commerce clause arguments as to each restriction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error. View "Direct Energy Services, LLC v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

These appeals arise from a dispute over rights-of-way granted to WPX Energy Williston, LLC by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The areas are located on allotments of land owned by members of the Fettig family within the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. WPX Energy and the Fettigs agreed to a condition, which was incorporated into the grants, that bans smoking on the right-of-way land. In 2020, the Fettigs sued WPX Energy in the Three Affiliated Tribes District Court, alleging that the company breached the smoking ban. WPX Energy moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The tribal court concluded that it possessed jurisdiction over the case and denied the motion to dismiss. WPX Energy appealed the decision to a tribal appellate court. he district court concluded that WPX Energy had exhausted its tribal court remedies and that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction, so it granted a preliminary injunction.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the injunction and remanded to the district court with directions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. The court concluded that WPX Energy did not exhaust its tribal court remedies and that a ruling in federal court on the question of tribal court jurisdiction was premature. The court explained that the policy of promoting tribal self-governance is not limited to tribal court proceedings that involve the development of a factual record. Rather, exhaustion of tribal court remedies “means that tribal appellate courts must have the opportunity to review the determinations of the lower tribal courts.” View "WPX Energy Williston, LLC v. Hon. B.J. Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment granted by the trial court in favor of a school corporation that contractually agreed to make biannual payments to a company for access to a wind turbine, holding that the contract was void and unenforceable.Randolph Eastern School Corporation (RESC) contractually agreed to make biannual payments to Performance Services, Inc. for a wind-turbine project. As part of the contract, Performance agreed to provide RESC with financial benefits tied to the net revenue of the turbine. RESC, which never made any payments to Performance, brought this declaratory judgment action seeking to void the contract on the grounds that it constituted an illegal investment. The trial court granted RESC's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the contract constituted an unauthorized investment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the contract between RESC and Performance was void and unenforceable because it constituted an investment unauthorized by statute. View "Performance Services, Inc. v. Randolph Eastern School Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals dismissing an administrative appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction in the underlying case involving an air emissions permit issued by the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency for the NorthMet mining project in northern Minnesota, holding that the service and other steps taken by Appellants were effective to invoke appellate jurisdiction and that the appeal was timely-filed under the thirty-day service deadline set forth in Minn. Stat. 14.63.After the Agency issued the permit at issue to Poly Met Mining, Inc., Appellants filed a certiorari appeal. The court of appeals granted PolyMet's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that Appellants had failed to serve PolyMet's counsel within thirty days of receiving the decision. At issue before Supreme Court was whether the service requirements in the judicial review provisions of the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act, Minn. Stat. 14.63-.69, require petitioners to serve appeal papers on a represented party's counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, when initiating judicial review where the parties were otherwise served directly, the Act's judicial review provisions do not require service on a represented party's attorney. View "In re Issuance of Air Emissions Permit No. 13700345-101 for PolyMet Mining Inc." on Justia Law

During World War II, the federal government played a significant role in American oil and gasoline production, often telling refineries what to produce and when to produce it. It also rationed crude oil and refining equipment, prioritized certain types of production, and regulated industry wages and prices. This case involves 12 refinery sites, all owned by Valero, that operated during the war, faced wartime regulations, and managed wartime waste. After the war, inspections revealed environmental contamination at each site. Valero started cleaning up the sites. It then sought contribution from the United States, arguing that the government “operated” each site during World War II. It did not contend that government personnel regularly disposed of waste at any of the sites or handled specific equipment there. Nor did it allege that the United States designed any of the refineries or made engineering decisions on their behalf.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court. The United States was not a refinery “operator” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. 9601–75. CERCLA liability requires control over activities “specifically related to pollution” rather than control over general pricing and product-related decisions. View "MRP Properties Co., LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

In these two consolidated cases involving claims brought against the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. (ERCOT) the Supreme Court answered, among other questions, that ERCOT is a governmental unit as defined in the Texas Tort Claims Act and is thereby entitled to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction.CPS Energy sued ERCOT and several of its officers for, inter alia, breach of contract. The trial court denied ERCOT'S plea to the jurisdiction. Ultimately, the court of appeals held that ERCOT was a governmental unit entitled to take an interlocutory appeal. In the second case, Panda sued ERCOT for, inter alia, fraud. The trial court denied ERCOT's pleas to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals ultimately held that ERCOT was not entitled to sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed in the first case and reversed in the other, holding (1) ERCOT was entitled to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction; (2) the Public Utility Commission of Texas has exclusive jurisdiction over the parties' claims against ERCOT; and (3) ERCOT was entitled to sovereign immunity. View "CPS Energy v. Electric Reliability Council of Texas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Public Service Commission (PSC) denying in part and granting in part motions for reconsideration of an order it issued setting forth the inputs it would use to calculate the export credit rate (ECR), holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction as to certain issues and, as to the two remaining issues, the PSC did not exceed the bounds of its authority.The export credit rate system at issue in this case was created to eventually replace the "net metering" program for customers who generated electricity. The PSC engaged in a lengthy public process to decide what factors to consider in calculating the ECR. After the PSC issued an order setting forth the inputs to use for the ECR Appellants filed motions for reconsideration. The PSC granted in part the motions, agreeing to reconsider some of the ECR calculation's components. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as to issues for which the Court lacked jurisdiction and otherwise denied the motion, holding that the PSC did not exceed the bounds of its authority. View "Vote Solar v. Public Service Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Minnesota Tax Court reducing the Commissioner of Revenue's valuations of CenterPoint Energy Minnegasco's natural gas distribution pipeline system for January 2, 2018 through January 2, 2019, holding that the Commissioner was not entitled to relief.The tax court reduced the Commissioner's valuations and ordered the Commissioner to recalculate Minnegasco's tax liability. The Commissioner appealed, challenging the tax court's income-equalization and cost approaches. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tax court (1) did not err in the way that it used the Commissioner's initial assessments when evaluating the totality of the evidence and making its independent evaluations; (2) did not abuse its discretion in considering the conflicting expert opinions; and (3) did not clearly err in finding external obsolescence. View "Commissioner of Revenue v. CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp." on Justia Law

Nicole Fitzpatrick obtained a dissolution of her marriage to Jeremy Fitzpatrick. The couple had minor children and significant marital assets, including real property, bank accounts, investments, and personal possessions. Among these were investments in oil and gas assets. The issue this case presented for the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s review centered on the Court of Civil Appeals decision regarding the division of the oil and gas assets. During the course of the marriage, Husband pursued a mutual goal of investments in oil and gas assets through two different ventures. He inextricably tied the Bakken and Energy deals and encumbered marital assets. The trial court found that all the A and B units of both the Bakken and Energy properties were acquired during the marriage through joint efforts of both parties, and were marital property subject to division. Because part of the properties' value lay in their future growth, the trial court considered the most equitable form of property division. The court ordered that future distributions and proceeds flowing from both sets of A and B units were to be held in constructive trust for both parties' benefit, and for Husband to distribute her equal marital share to Wife. COCA reversed the trial court's decisions regarding the Energy A and B units, finding that the trial court should have determined the units' value and set a valuation date. COCA also found that the trial court's use of a constructive trust for the Energy units was not proper. However, COCA did not disturb the trial court's use of a constructive trust with regard to the Bakken units. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s authority to distribute the assets although they could not be valued at the time of the divorce decree; the Court concurred with the trial court’s imposition of a constructive trust to ensure protection of the assets’ future value. View "Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick" on Justia Law