Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

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The case revolves around a former underground coal miner, Randy Brown, who contracted occupational pneumoconiosis (OP) due to his exposure to coal dust. In 2016, he was granted a 30% permanent partial disability (PPD) award for his OP. In 2018, Brown sought an increase in his award, claiming his condition had worsened. The Occupational Pneumoconiosis Board (OP Board) examined Brown and determined that he had an additional 20% impairment, bringing his total impairment rating to 50%. The claims administrator granted an additional 20% PPD award, which was protested by Brown's employer, Rockspring Development, Inc.Rockspring's protest was heard by the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges, which affirmed the claims administrator’s decision. Rockspring then appealed to the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Board of Review, which also affirmed the decision. During the pendency of the claim process, Brown underwent a bilateral lung transplant. Post-transplant, Brown’s pulmonary function testing and x-ray reports showed no evidence of OP. Rockspring argued that the Board of Review was clearly wrong in affirming the additional 20% PPD award because Brown no longer had OP or any pulmonary impairment.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia disagreed with Rockspring's argument. The court noted that the relevant statutes do not indicate whether the decisionmaker should consider the pulmonary function of the pre-transplant lungs or the function of the post-transplant lungs when the transplant occurred during the pendency of the claim proceedings. Given the unique circumstances of the case and the deference afforded to the Board of Review, the court affirmed the Board of Review’s decision granting Brown an additional 20% PPD award. View "Rockspring Development, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed a case involving Samson Exploration, LLC and several families, including the Bordages, from whom Samson held oil-and-gas leases. The families sued Samson for unpaid royalties under those leases. The Bordages claimed that they were entitled to late charges on the late charges, arguing that the leases' Late Charge Provision imposed late charges on late charges, compounding them each month. Samson disagreed, asserting that the late charges were not compounded.Previously, the trial court found Samson liable for breach of contract and awarded the Bordages $12,955,919 in contract damages, based on the interpretation of the Late Charge Provision. The Bordages argued that collateral estoppel prevented the Supreme Court from deciding whether the Late Charge Provision calls for simple or compound interest because that issue was previously resolved in another case involving Samson and a different lessor, the Hooks case.The Supreme Court of Texas held that Texas law disfavors compound interest, and an agreement for interest on unpaid amounts is an agreement for simple interest absent an express, clear, and specific provision for compound interest. The court also held that Samson’s prior litigation of the issue does not collaterally estop it from asserting its claims here. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "SAMSON EXPLORATION, LLC v. BORDAGES" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed the decision of the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (PRC) to deny Southwestern Public Service Company’s (SPS) application for a financial incentive under the Renewable Energy Act (REA). SPS had proposed to retire renewable energy certificates (RECs) earlier than required to exceed the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), and in return, requested a rate rider that would allow it to charge customers one dollar for each REC retired over the twenty percent standard. The PRC denied the application, finding that SPS’s proposal did not meet the REA’s requirement to “produce or acquire renewable energy” to qualify for an incentive. The court agreed with the PRC’s interpretation of the REA, stating that the act of retiring RECs alone does nothing to further the statute’s objectives. The court also rejected SPS’s challenges to the PRC’s amendments to Rule 572, which governs the award of incentives under the REA. The court found that the amendments did not exceed the scope of the REA, were not arbitrary or capricious, and were not otherwise unreasonable or unlawful. View "S.W. Pub. Serv. Co. v. N.M. Pub. Regul. Comm'n" on Justia Law

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The case involves SCS Carbon Transport LLC ("Summit") and a group of landowners. Summit plans to construct an interstate pipeline to transport carbon dioxide to sequestration sites in North Dakota and four other states. To determine the appropriate pipeline route, Summit needs to access the landowners' properties. However, the landowners denied Summit permission to enter their lands. Consequently, Summit filed lawsuits against the landowners, seeking a court order confirming its right under North Dakota law to enter the lands to conduct pre-condemnation surveys and examinations. The landowners counterclaimed, arguing that the statute authorizing entry is unconstitutional.The district courts granted summary judgment to Summit, concluding that the statute does not constitute an unconstitutional per se taking, Summit is a common carrier authorized to exercise eminent domain, and the proposed surveys and examinations are the type of minimally invasive surveys and examinations allowed under the statute. The courts confirmed Summit's right to enter the lands to complete civil, environmental, and archaeological/cultural surveys and examinations, including any necessary geotechnical/soil borings, archaeological/cultural resource surveys and examinations, and including any necessary core or water sampling activities subject to any conditions.The landowners appealed the judgments and order granting summary judgment, arguing that the statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to them under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and article I, § 16 of the North Dakota Constitution.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court concluded that the landowners have not established a constitutional violation on the face of the entry statute or as applied to them, and the judgments and order do not exceed the scope of the entry statute. The court also found that the district court's judgment does not grant Summit an indefinite or perpetual right of access. The court held that a constitutionally permissible entry may not be longer or more invasive than necessary to complete the examination or survey needed to confirm and minimize the scope of the anticipated taking of private property. View "SCS Carbon Transport v. Malloy" on Justia Law

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The case involves Continental Resources, Inc., an Oklahoma oil and gas company, and Rick and Rosella Fisher, who own a farm in North Dakota. Continental drilled a horizontal disposal well on the Fishers' property to inject saltwater waste into the pore space of a rock formation known as the Lodgepole. The Fishers sued Continental, claiming that the company had no right to drill the well. The district court ruled that Continental had the right to proceed with drilling and using the well as long as the use was reasonable, but the Fishers were entitled to compensation for any proven damage to their pore space.The district court denied Continental's motion for judgment as a matter of law and the jury awarded the Fishers $22,440.25. Continental then renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, moved for a new trial. The Fishers moved for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. The district court denied Continental’s motion and awarded the Fishers $249,243.60 in attorneys’ fees and $87,639.89 in costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the third-party contracts and Rick Fisher’s testimony. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's award of attorneys’ fees and costs to the Fishers. View "Continental Resources, Inc. v. Fisher" on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute over a lease agreement between Tera, L.L.C., and Rice Drilling D, L.L.C., and Gulfport Energy Corporation. The lease granted Rice Drilling and Gulfport Energy certain mineral rights in the geological formations known as the Marcellus Shale and the Utica Shale beneath Tera’s land. The dispute arose when Tera claimed that the defendants had intentionally drilled six wells into the Point Pleasant formation, which Tera argued was not included in the lease agreement.The trial court awarded summary judgment to Tera, concluding that the lease agreement clearly limited the rights granted to the defendants to the Marcellus and Utica formations and reserved rights to all other formations. The court also found that the defendants had trespassed in bad faith, and a jury awarded Tera over $40 million in damages.The Court of Appeals for Belmont County affirmed the trial court's decision. The court concluded that the lease language was unambiguous and that the phrase "Utica Shale" had a technical stratigraphic meaning that did not include the Point Pleasant formation.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the lease agreement was ambiguous because it did not clearly establish whether the Point Pleasant was or was not to be considered part of the Utica Shale. The court concluded that resolving the meaning of ambiguous terms in a contract is a matter of factual determination for the fact-finder. Therefore, the court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Tera, L.L.C. v. Rice Drilling D, L.L.C." on Justia Law

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Latigo Oil & Gas, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation, filed a lawsuit against BP America Production Company, a Delaware corporation, to enforce its preferential right to purchase certain mineral interests that BP had offered for sale as part of a package deal to a third party. Prior to trial, Latigo requested a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief to prevent BP from selling the interests to the third-party buyer pending trial. The trial court granted Latigo's request for preliminary injunctive relief.The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the evidence did not show Latigo was likely to succeed on the merits. The court held that BP did not owe Latigo a duty to provide a good-faith allocation of value to the interests burdened by Latigo's preferential right. It found that whether the allocations provided by BP were inflated as alleged by Latigo was irrelevant, as the notices provided by BP met the terms of the operating agreements.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma granted certiorari and held that the trial court's grant of injunctive relief was not an abuse of discretion. The court noted that while there was no binding precedent on whether an allocation of value within a package deal must be made in good faith, substantial support for Latigo's position could be found in both Oklahoma precedent and in other jurisdictions. The court affirmed the trial court's decision to grant preliminary injunctive relief and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "LATIGO OIL & GAS v. BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO." on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a dispute between Anne Carl and related parties (the royalty holders) and Hilcorp Energy Company (the producer) over the calculation of royalties from a mineral lease. The lease stipulates that royalties are to be calculated based on the market value of the minerals "at the well," meaning before any post-production efforts have increased their value. However, the minerals are often not sold until after these efforts have taken place, resulting in a higher sale price. To account for this disparity, the producer deducted the proportionate share of post-production costs from the royalty payment, a method known as the "workback method." The royalty holders were dissatisfied with this reduced payment and sued, arguing that the lease required payment of a royalty on all gas produced from the well.The case was initially heard in a federal district court, which sided with the producer. The court found that the lease did indeed convey an "at-the-well" royalty, meaning the royalty holders were obligated to share proportionately in the post-production costs. The court also found no fault with the producer's method of accounting for these costs, which involved using some of the gas produced from the well to power post-production activities conducted off the lease. The value of this gas was considered a post-production cost and was therefore deducted from the total volume of gas used to calculate the royalty.The case was then certified to the Supreme Court of Texas, which affirmed the lower court's decision. The court agreed with the producer's interpretation of the lease and found that the royalty holders, as holders of an "at-the-well" royalty, were indeed obligated to bear their usual share of post-production costs. The court also found that the producer's method of accounting for these costs was permissible. The court concluded that the royalty holders were not shortchanged and that the producer's calculation was one acceptable way to convert the downstream sales price into an at-the-well market value on which to pay the royalty, as required by the lease. View "CARL v. HILCORP ENERGY COMPANY" on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute over the interpretation of an assignment of mineral rights. In 1987, Shell Western E&P, Inc. sold a large bundle of Texas oil-and-gas properties to the predecessor of Citation 2002 Investment LLC. The assignment included an exhibit that listed the properties being transferred, some of which included depth specifications. In 1997, Shell purported to assign all its interests in the same leases to Occidental Permian’s predecessor. Occidental claimed that Shell had reserved to itself interests beyond the depth specifications of the 1987 assignment. Citation, however, claimed that it received the entirety of Shell’s leasehold interests in the 1987 assignment.The trial court granted Occidental’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the depth-specified tracts listed in the exhibit reserved to Shell the mineral-estate depths beyond the notations. Citation appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the 1987 assignment unambiguously conveyed the entirety of Shell’s interests in the leasehold estates without reserving portions of those interests to Shell.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the court of appeals' decision. The court held that the disputed assignment unambiguously conveyed all right, title, and interest that Shell owned in the leasehold estates listed in the exhibit, without reserving portions of those interests to itself through further notations about specific tracts within those estates. The court reasoned that the assignment's broad granting language, coupled with the absence of explicit reservation language, indicated that the entirety of the leasehold interests were conveyed. The court also noted that the depth specifications in the exhibit served a concrete purpose of providing notice of depth-specific third-party interests that continue after the leasehold estates are assigned. View "OCCIDENTAL PERMIAN, LTD. v. CITATION 2002 INVESTMENT LLC" on Justia Law

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The case involves Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC (Appellee), which is constructing an interstate natural gas pipeline. The company acquired easements on properties along the pipeline’s route through condemnation actions under the Natural Gas Act. One such property was owned by Frank Terry, John Coles Terry, and Elizabeth Terry (Appellants), which was encumbered by temporary and permanent easements on 8.37 acres. After the district court granted Appellee immediate possession of the easements, the case proceeded to a jury trial to determine the amount of just compensation owed by Appellee to Appellants for the easements. The jury rendered a $523,327 verdict, which Appellee challenged, arguing that the verdict resulted from the jury improperly mixing expert testimony. The district court agreed with Appellee and granted judgment as a matter of law, vacating the jury verdict and entering a judgment for $261,033.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment as a matter of law and remanded with instructions to reinstate the $523,327 verdict. The court held that the jury’s verdict was within the range of credited testimony and could be supported using residential values alone, without the need to venture beyond the credited testimony. The court also reversed the district court’s grant of a new trial. Additionally, the court vacated and remanded the district court’s order denying Appellants’ second motion for attorney’s fees and costs, leaving these issues for the district court to consider in the first instance. View "Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 8.37 Acres of Land" on Justia Law