Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

This case involved a dispute over the ownership of mineral rights appurtenant to several tracts of land located in Haskell County, Kansas. Michael Leathers and his brother Ronald Leathers each inherited half of these mineral rights from their mother. But an error in a quit claim deed subsequently executed between the brothers left it unclear whether Ronald’s one-half interest in the mineral estate had been conveyed to Michael. In a series of orders spanning several years, the district court (1) reformed the quit claim deed to reflect that Ronald had reserved his one-half interest in the mineral estate; (2) awarded half of Ronald’s one-half interest to Ronald’s wife Theresa (pursuant to Ronald and Theresa’s divorce decree); and (3) held that Ronald owed approximately $1.5 million to the IRS and that the IRS’s tax liens had first priority to any present and future royalties due to Ronald from his remaining one-quarter mineral interest. Ronald appealed, but finding no reversible error in the district court’s judgment with respect to the reformation and the interests, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court on all grounds. View "Leathers v. Leathers" on Justia Law

After BP America Production turned of the well valve to a gas well, Red Deer Resources, LLC, the top-lease holder, filed suit, asking the trial court to declare that BP’s lease had terminated. The jury found that the well was incapable of production in paying quantities the day after BP closed the valve and eight days after the last gas was sold or used. Based on these findings, the trial court declared that BP’s lease had lapsed and terminated, thus terminating BP’s lease in its secondary term. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of BP, holding that because Red Deer never obtained a finding that the well was incapable of production in paying quantities on the material date under the plain language of the lease, BP’s lease remained valid. View "BP America Production Co. v. Red Deer Resources, LLC" on Justia Law

Respondent, who owned a ranch, sued Petitioner, which produced natural gas on the ranch, for underpayment of royalties and underproduction of its lease. The parties resolved their dispute with two agreements that contained an arbitration provision. Respondent later sued Petitioner for environmental contamination and improper disposal of hazardous materials on the ranch. Before arbitration commenced, Respondent asked the Railroad Commission (RRC) to investigate contamination of the ranch by Petitioner. Meanwhile, an arbitration panel awarded Respondent $15 million for actual damages and $500,000 for exemplary damages. At issue on appeal was whether the RRC had exclusive or primary jurisdiction over Respondent’s claims, precluding the arbitration, and whether the arbitration award should be vacated for the evident partiality of a neutral arbitrator or because the arbitrators exceeded their powers. The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding (1) because Respondent’s claims were inherently judicial, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not apply, and vacatur was not warranted for failure to abate the arbitration hearing; and (2) the arbitrators did not exceed their authority. View "Forest Oil Corp. v. El Rucio Land & Cattle Co." on Justia Law

Louisville Gas and Electric Company (LG&E) sought a permit authorizing it to discharge certain pollutants into the Ohio River in conjunction with the operation of its recently expended generating facility. The Commonwealth of Kentucky, Energy and Environment Cabinet’s Division of Water issued the permit. The circuit court vacated the permit. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated LG&E’s permit, holding (1) in vacating the permit, the circuit court and Court of Appeals misapplied controlling federal law; and (2) the Cabinet’s determination that the LG&E permit should proceed under 40 C.F.R. 125.3(c)(1) was a reasonable interpretation of the regulation. View "Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Kentucky Waterways Alliance" on Justia Law

Charles W.H. Monson, LeeAnn Tarter, and KayCee Williams ("the Monsons") appealed a district court judgment reforming a deed executed in 1980 and quieting title in favor of Steve Goodall, Robert Goodall, Anne Stout, Joanne Quale, and Darrel Quale ("the Goodalls"). This case involved the sale of mineral rights to four tracts of land executed in one deed. In 1980, George and Dorothy Hoffman executed a deed transferring an undivided 508.26/876.26 mineral interest to Francis and Alice Goodall. Subsequent to the execution of these deeds, the Hoffmans retained a total of 508.26 mineral acres out of 876.26 total acres in the subject property. This fractional interest language in the 1980 deed is at the center of this dispute. Dorothy Hoffman died in 1985. George Hoffman died intestate in 1998. The Monsons acquired by intestate succession any mineral interests the Hoffmans retained beneath the subject property. Sometime after George Hoffman's death, members of the Monson family entered into oil and gas lease agreements with Enerplus Resources and Northern Oil and Gas, Inc. In 2013, the Goodall's filed a complaint requesting the district court quiet title in their favor. The Monsons moved for summary judgment, arguing the 1980 deed was unambiguous, the Hoffmans only transferred a fractional interest to the Goodalls, and the Monsons inherited their interests from what the Hoffmans retained in the transaction. The Goodalls claimed the deed did not reflect the parties' intentions, which was to transfer all of the Hoffmans' 508.26 mineral acres to Francis and Alice Goodall. After a hearing, the district court denied the Monsons' motion for summary judgment. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in admitting extrinsic evidence to support the Goodalls' argument that a mutual mistake had been made, and the district court's findings supporting reformation of the deed were not clearly erroneous. View "Goodall v. Monson" on Justia Law

Section 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), 16 U.S.C. 824a-3, seeks to reduce reliance on fossil fuels by increasing the number of energy-efficient cogeneration and small power-production facilities. Oregon implements its PURPA responsibilities largely through its Public Utility Commission (OPUC), which has directed utilities subject to its jurisdiction to draft off-the-shelf, standard-form power-purchase agreements that OPUC then reviews for compliance with PURPA. OPUC has approved two standard-form power-purchase agreements submitted by petitioner Portland General Electric. Petitioner PáTu Wind Farm, a six-turbine, nine-megawatt generator in rural Oregon, is classified under PURPA as a small power producer. This appeal stems from the parties' dispute over the nature of Portland General's purchase obligation. The Commission ruled that under PURPA, Portland General must purchase all of PáTu’s power, though it rejected PáTu’s insistence that Portland General do so by utilizing a technology known as dynamic scheduling. The court concluded that PáTu’s petition dealing exclusively with Portland's refusal to utilize dynamic scheduling is without merit. Accordingly, the court denied PáTu’s petition. The court dismissed Portland's petition challenging the Commission's ruling that it must purchase all of PáTu’s power for lack of jurisdiction because FERC's orders were advisory. View "Portland General Electric Comp v. FERC" on Justia Law

Jennifer Ogren, Lisa Marie Ogren Castle and Eric Marcus Ogren appeal from a summary judgment in favor of Marlene Sandaker, Karen Walden and Marlys Rulon. In 1958 Mike and Lorene Albert conveyed a 1/8th royalty interest to each of Mike Albert's seven siblings. Mike and Lorene Albert retained the mineral interest and a 1/8th royalty interest. Each of Mike Albert's siblings owned a 1/8th royalty interest. In 2009 Sandaker, Walden and Rulon leased the property to an oil company for a 3/16th royalty interest. In 2011 an attorney prepared a drilling title opinion concluding the 1958 assignment of royalty conveyed a fractional royalty to Mike Albert's seven siblings. A second title opinion in 2012 concluded the 1958 assignment of royalty conveyed a fraction of royalty to Mike Albert's seven siblings. In 2013 the Ogrens commenced an action to quiet title to the disputed royalty interests. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment to resolve the interpretation of the 1958 assignment. The district court entered an order and judgment in favor of Sandaker, Walden and Rulon, determining as a matter of law the 1958 assignment conveyed a fraction of royalty. The Ogrens appealed, arguing the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Sandaker, Walden and Rulon because the 1958 assignment of royalty granted a fractional royalty and not a fraction of royalty. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ogren v. Sandaker" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants, a certified class of Osage tribal members who owned headrights, appealed the district court’s accounting order. Plaintiffs alleged that the government was improperly distributing royalties to non-Osage tribal members, which diluted the royalties for the Osage tribal members, the rightful headright owners. The complaint attributed this misdistribution to the government’s mismanagement of the trust assets and the government’s failure to perform an accounting. Thus, Plaintiffs sought to compel the government to perform an accounting and to prospectively restrict royalty payments to Osage tribal members and their heirs. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ accounting claim because it found that the applicable statute only required the government to account for deposits, not withdrawals, and that such an accounting would not support Plaintiffs’ misdistribution claim. After review, the Tenth Circuit could not say the district court abused its discretion. "The accounting the district court fashioned will certainly inform Plaintiffs of the trust receipts and disbursements and to whom those disbursements were made." View "Fletcher v. United States" on Justia Law

This petition for review returned to a long series of administrative cases arising out of the California energy crisis of 2000 and 2001 all centering on whether the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “Commission”) acted arbitrarily or capriciously in calculating certain refunds. FERC that FERC had acted outside its jurisdiction when ordering governmental entities/non-public utilities to pay refunds, the Commission vacated each of its orders in the California refund proceeding to the extent that they ordered governmental entities/nonpublic utilities to pay refunds. In sum, although the tariffs were not specific, the Ninth Circuit could not concluded FERC acted arbitrarily or capriciously in its construction of the tariffs. View "California Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased property on which oil and gas operations had been conducted. Plaintiff filed suit against Hess, asserting claims for damages stemming from contamination caused by the oil- and gas-related activities on the tract. The oil and gas leases expired in 1973 and plaintiff purchased the property in 2007, when all wells had been plugged and abandoned. The district court granted Hess's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the subsequent purchaser rule barred plaintiff's claims. The court explained that a clear consensus has emerged among all Louisiana appellate courts that have considered the issue, and they have held that the subsequent purchaser rule does apply to cases, like this one, involving expired mineral leases. Because this case presented no occasion to depart from precedent, the court deferred to these precedents, and held that the subsequent purchaser doctrine barred plaintiff's claims. The court noted that although the denial of a writ is not necessarily an approval of the appellate court's decision nor precedential, the Louisiana Supreme Court has had multiple opportunities to consider this issue and has repeatedly declined to do so. Finally, the court declined to certify questions to the state court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Guilbeau v. Hess Corp." on Justia Law