Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on whether the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA), as amended by the Reform Act of 1987, required the Secretary of the Interior to issue leases for parcels of land to the highest bidding energy company within sixty days of payment to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Appellants (collectively, "Energy Companies") sued to compel the Secretary to issue pending leases on which they were the high bidders and more than sixty days had passed since they had paid the BLM in full. The district court construed the MLA to impose a mandate on the Secretary to decide whether to issue the leases, and ordered BLM to make such decisions regarding the still pending leases of Energy Companies within thirty days. Energy Companies appealed the district court's order and asserted that the MLA required the Secretary to issue the pending leases within sixty days rather than merely make a decision on whether the leases will be issued. Upon review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court’s order was not a "final decision," and as such, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the Energy Companies' appeal. View "Western Energy Alliance v. Salazar" on Justia Law

Columbia Gas disagrees with the Singhs over the scope of an existing pipeline right-of-way. Columbia suit in federal court to enjoin the Singhs and their tenant from engaging in activity that Columbia believed could lead to violations of Columbia’s duties under federal laws regulating natural gas service and pipeline safety. Although the cause of action appeared to be an Ohio interference-with-easement claim, Columbia’s complaint referred to the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717–717w, as a basis for federal jurisdiction. Without explicitly addressing jurisdiction, the district court held a status conference at which the parties reached a settlement. When the Singhs refused to comply with Columbia’s understanding of the settlement, the district court granted Columbia’s motion to enforce the settlement. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction over this property dispute between nondiverse parties. Columbia’s complaint neither asserted a federal cause of action nor showed that a substantial federal interest was implicated by its state-law claim. View "Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. Singh" on Justia Law

Several environmental groups challenged decisions made by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) regarding the legality of thirty-nine oil and gas leases in Southern Utah, owned by Kirkwood Oil and Gas, LLC and William C. Kirkwood. In the 1980s, Kirkwood applied to have its oil and gas leases converted to combined hydrocarbon leases, which would allow Kirkwood to extract oil from tar sands. At the time, BLM never accepted or rejected Kirkwood's applications. Between 2006 and 2008, BLM and IBLA issued several decisions declaring that the underlying oil and gas leases were "suspended" pending review of the conversion applications. The groups alleged that the BLM and IBLA violated the Mineral Leasing Act and other federal laws by retroactively deeming the leases to be suspended, avoiding expiration of the leases according to their terms. The district court held the groups did not have standing to bring its claims and dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Although the district court misapplied the law in important respects with regard to standing, the Tenth Circuit ultimately held that this case was not ripe for review. View "S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Palma" on Justia Law

Ida-Therm, LLC appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Bedrock Geothermal, LLC, which held that a reservation of "all the oil, gas, and minerals, in, on, or under the surface of [deeded] lands," in a 1946 warranty deed included the geothermal resources underlying the property. The district court determined that the Deed's mineral reservation severed the mineral estate from the surface estate, and that geothermal resources were included in the scope of the mineral estate. Because the Supreme Court found that the term "mineral" was ambiguous with respect to the deed in question, and because ambiguous grants in deeds are construed against the grantor, the Court construed the grant in favor of Ida-Therm and reversed the district court. View "Ida-Therm v. Bedrock Geothermal" on Justia Law

Plaintiff David Farrell, Trustee of the David Farrell Trust, appealed the grant of summary judgment for defendants Vermont Electric Power Company and Vermont Transco (together, VELCO), the holders of an easement for the construction and operation of electrical transmission lines on plaintiff's property. Plaintiff claimed that VELCO's easement was limited to the installation and operation of transmission lines necessary for the "Queen City Tap Project." He argued that VELCO exceeded the scope of its easement by installing a second transmission line on plaintiff's property in connection with an unrelated transmission-line project. The trial court held that the easement's express terms authorized VELCO to install transmission lines unrelated to the Queen City Tap Project, and that any increased impact on plaintiff's property caused by the new line did not amount to overburdening. "VELCO's easement, by its express terms, authorized its installation of the NRP line on the Property. Such use is also consistent with the easement's purpose - the transmission of electricity - and does not impose an additional burden on the Property requiring further compensation." Accordingly, the trial court's grant of summary judgment for VELCO was affirmed. View "Farrell v. Vermont Electric Power Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff owns three tracts, zoned agricultural, and challenged a 2009 amendment to the Winnebago County zoning ordinance that makes it easier to obtain permission to build a wind farm. She claimed that a wind farm on adjacent land would deprive the property “of the full extent of the kinetic energy of the wind and air as it enters the property, subjecting it to shadow flicker and reduction of light, severe noise, possible ice throw and blade throws, interference with radar, cell phone, GPS, television, and other wireless communications, increased likelihood of lightening damage and stray voltage. increased electromagnetic radiation, prevention of crop dusting, drying out her land, and killing raptors. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the claim as simply that a wind farm adjacent to plaintiff’s property would be a nuisance. There is no merit to the claim that the amendment violates plaintiff’s constitutional rights. It is a “modest legislative encouragement of wind farming,” within the constitutional authority, state as well as federal, of a local government.View "Muscarello v. Winnebago Cnty. Bd." on Justia Law

EQT Production Company was the lessee of an oil and gas lease. Matthew Hamblet was the surface owner of a parcel of property included within EQT's leasehold. EQT filed a permit application with the Office of Oil and Gas of the West Virginia EPA (DEP) for a shallow well targeting a Marcellus formation. The DEP issued the permit requested by EQT. Subsequently, Hamblet filed a petition for appeal of the issuance of the well permit in the circuit court. The DEP and EQT filed motions to dismiss the petition contending that Hamblet did not have the right to appeal the issuance of the permit. The circuit court denied the motions, concluding that Hamblet had the right to appeal the permit, but submitted its ruling to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held (1) upon consideration of the court of appeals' opinion in State ex rel. Lovejoy v. Callaghan and the relevant statutes, a surface owner is not permitted to seek judicial review of the DEP's issuance of a well work permit for a horizontal Marcellus well; and (2) given this fact, the Court had no basis to find Hamblet had a right to appeal the well work permitted issued by the DEP. View "Martin v. Hamblet" on Justia Law

A school district (District) obtained an in rem delinquent property tax judgment against an oil and gas lease that Respondent owned and operated. Respondent did not appeal, and the District foreclosed its judgment lien on the leasehold, taking ownership. The Railroad Commission ordered Respondent to plug a well on the lease. Respondent did not comply, and the Commission plugged the well and brought an enforcement action in court to recover the costs of the operation and the penalty. Respondent and the Commission settled. Respondent then sued the District, alleging in part that the District's actions had resulted in a taking of his property requiring compensation. The trial court dismissed Respondent's action for want of jurisdiction, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded with respect to the takings claim. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the case, holding that the trial court correctly dismissed Respondent's case, as Respondent did not assert on appeal that the District took his property without compensation. View "W. Hardin County Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Poole" on Justia Law

Wenco, a North Dakota limited partnership, appealed a judgment quieting title to certain Mountrail County royalty and mineral interests in EOG Resources, Inc. ("EOG"), and QEP Energy Company ("QEP"), and dismissing Wenco's claims for conversion and unjust enrichment against EOG and QEP. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err in ruling as a matter of law that Wenco's interest bore the entire burden of a prior royalty interest conveyance in the subject property, that EOG and QEP did not waive their rights to claim the prior royalty interest conveyance burdened only Wenco's interest, and consequently, that Wenco had no viable claims against EOG and QEP for conversion and unjust enrichment. View "Wenco v. EOG Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the Lowell Mountains Group, Inc. (LMG), and the Towns of Albany and Craftsbury, challenged several Public Service Board orders related to the construction of a wind-electric-generation facility and associated facilities on Lowell Mountain in Lowell, Vermont. In May 2010, petitioners Green Mountain Power Corporation (GMP), Vermont Electric Cooperative, Inc. (VEC), and Vermont Electric Power Company, Inc. and Vermont Transco LLC (VELCO) requested a certificate of public good (CPG) to construct a wind-electric-generation facility on Lowell Mountain. On May 31, 2011, following testimony, site visits, a public hearing, and hearings, the Board issued a final order granting a CPG subject to forty-five conditions. Appellants and several other parties moved for reconsideration. On July 12, 2011, the Board modified its final order in certain respects. The Towns and LMG appealed that final order with modifications. The parties also raised compliance issues with the final order that the Board ultimately overruled. Upon review of the Board's orders, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion, and deferred to the Board's decisions with regard to the final order. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Board. View "In re Green Mountain Power Corp." on Justia Law